Reverse engineer a patch into a full exploit chain
A researcher used Claude Opus in Claude Code with Playwright MCP to decompile code, find vulnerabilities, and build a working exploit.
What they did
Kev Breen gave Claude Opus in Claude Code (with Ghidra/ilspy, semgrep, Playwright and Proxmox tools, root on an isolated code-server harness) a single prompt to investigate a newly reported PaperCut NG zero-day, build a lab VM, and patch-diff the vendor fix. The agent autonomously decompiled jars, traced IoCs, found an auth-bypass and SQLi, used Playwright to drive the admin UI, and iteratively built and self-tested PoC scripts, with the human mainly steering direction and challenging weak conclusions.
How it went
Within 90 minutes it produced a working unauthenticated RCE chain (auth bypass, SQLi, arbitrary file write, code execution), later finding a third bypass that defeated the emergency patch too; total run used 10 prompts, 293 tool calls, 224M tokens over about two hours, though it initially hit a dead-end chain and made a false 'validated' claim the researcher had to catch.
Worth knowing
Hit an Opus 5 safety guardrail when checking exploitation logs, forcing a fallback to Opus 4.8 mid-session.
Labels
A researcher used Claude Opus in Claude Code with Playwright MCP to decompile code, find vulnerabilities, and build a working exploit.
iteratively built and self-tested PoC scripts
The agent autonomously decompiled jars, traced IoCs, found an auth-bypass and SQLi, used Playwright to drive the admin UI, and iteratively built and self-tested PoC scripts
Kev Breen gave Claude Opus in Claude Code (with Ghidra/ilspy, semgrep, Playwright and Proxmox tools, root on an isolated code-server harness) a single prompt to investigate a newly reported PaperCut NG zero-day, build a lab VM, and patch-diff the vendor fix.
The “Material” label failed its quality check and is not used for selection.
Details
- Agents
- Claude Code
- Source
- other
- Source date
- Aug 27, 2026
- Accounts
- 1
- In registry since
- Oct 12, 2026